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REPLY: FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON 
LIBERTARIAN CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
William H. Simon 
Since David Luban's is the work on legal ethics that I admire and 
agree with most, there is an element of perversity in my vehement 
critique of his arguments on criminal defense. I am therefore espe-
cially thankful for his gracious and thoughtful response. Nevertheless, 
I remain convinced that Luban is mistaken in excepting criminal de-
fense from much of the responsibility to substantive justice that we 
both think appropriate in every other sphere of lawyering. 
I. LIBERTARIANISM V. LIBERALISM 
Luban takes exception to my characterization of his position as 
libertarian, rather than liberal. 1 It is clear why he prefers the term 
liberal. Libertarianism is a term associated with doctrines that, 
outside the sphere of legal ethics, mainstream discourse treats as ex-
treme and marginal. Yet the hallmark of these doctrines is precisely 
the privileging of the danger of state violations of rights over the dan-
ger of private violations of rights upon which Luban's analysis 
depends. 
Luban argues that liberalism starts with the idea of checking state 
abuse of rights. 2 I think it is more plausible to assert that liberalism 
starts with the idea of rights. You cannot derive aggressive defense 
from this notion of rights because aggressive defense often aims to 
achieve goals that are inconsistent with rights: either to help the de-
fendant achieve a result to which she is not substantively entitled or to 
help her escape the consequences of her violation of the victim's rights. 
The traditional public ambivalence or hostility toward aggressive de-
fense is solidly grounded in the liberal conception of rights. 
A basic problem for libertarians is the possibility that the enforce-
ment of the substantive rights to which they are committed may re-
quire a more powerful state than they can tolerate. Their broad, 
categorical proposals to limit the state's power to abuse rights also 
limit its power to enforce them. Luban denies this paradox. He ap-
pears to argue that whether there is a trade-off - between the protec-
1. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1730 (1993). 
2. Id. at 1749-52. 
1767 
1768 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1767 
tion against state abuse that aggressive defense affords and the 
enforcement of the substantive criminal law - is an empirical ques-
tion. He also seems to suggest that I have the burden of proof on this 
issue, and that I have failed to carry the burden. 3 
Recall, however, that I defined aggressive defense in terms of con-
duct that increased the probability of acquittal without tending to fa-
cilitate adjudication on the merits.4 Thus, if aggressive defense has 
any effect at all on outcomes, it will almost necessarily frustrate sub-
stantive enforcement. 
Whether aggressive defense has any impact on outcomes is an em-
pirical question, and I am inclined to agree with Luban's intuition 
that, from the point of view of the whole system, its impact is probably 
slight. But this fact seems far more damaging to Luban's position 
than mine. As I will elaborate below, I do not believe that the only 
harm of aggressive defense is to contribute to wrongful outcomes; I 
think the principal harm it causes is to distort the normative under-
standing of criminal defense and the moral self-conception of its prac-
titioners. On the other hand, Luban thinks the unique benefit of 
aggressive defense is to check the power of the state, and I do not see 
how it could have such an effect unless it also had an effect on 
outcomes. 
II. IMBALANCE 
Luban's comparative analysis of funding and personnel suggests 
that there is some substance to the ritual claim that the prosecution 
has a resource advantage. I will suggest in a moment that this fact is 
beside the main point of my argument, but I note here that there are 
some reasons why one might expect the prosecution to have more re-
sources even in a fair system. 
First, not all the activities of prosecutors involve prosecution. 
Prosecutors spend a substantial amount of time investigating and ana-
lyzing cases that they never file. There is no general counterpart to the 
prosecutor's "screening" activity on the defense side. Although a few 
wealthy individuals occasionally consult defense lawyers before they 
are charged or in situations where charges are never filed, nearly all 
defense work is performed after charging. 
Second, prosecutors labor under a procedural disadvantage that 
dwarfs all the advantages Luban emphasizes. They have the burden of 
3. Id. at 1730-31. 
4. William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1705-06 
(1993). 
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proof, and it is a high one. In general I would expect the party with 
the burden of proof to require a resource advantage. 
Third, some prosecution activities benefit the defense because of 
the Brady rule requiring the prosecutor to make exculpatory material 
available to the defense. By contrast, defense activities typically bene-
fit only the defense. 
Luban also mentions a series of procedural rules that he thinks 
support the claim that there is an "inherent inequality of litigating 
position" in favor of the state and against the defendant. 5 I agree that 
the rules he mentions - such as the defendant's limited right to dis-
covery of the prosecution's case - are unsound. I do not think, how-
ever, that such a list can be summed into a general conclusion about 
inequality. There is no metric that can measure these disadvantages 
against the prosecution's advantages and, even if there were, there is 
no intelligible standard of procedural equality to apply to the meas-
ures. Surely equality can not mean that the prosecution and the de-
fense have equal probabilities of winning. The fact that prosecutors 
win disproportionately says little about fairness until we know some-
thing about how often they deserved substantively to win. 
The fact that there are unsound procedures that disadvantage de-
fendants is a matter for concern. The reason for concern, however, is 
not that the situation violates some abstract notion of procedural 
equality, but that it creates a risk of substantively unjust conviction. 
That risk is not present in all cases, however. In cases where we can 
reliably determine that there is no risk of substantively unjust convic-
tion, the presence of some unsound procedures ought not to warrant 
aggressive defense. 
Moreover, even where abuse is manifest, justifying aggressive de-
fense as a counterweight to specific bad rules and practices is quite 
different from justifying it as a response to some general potential for 
state abuse. The potential for state abuse is eternal, but the bad rules 
and practices could, and some day might, be specifically reformed. 
III. CATEGORICAL V. CONTEXTUAL JUDGMENT 
Most of Luban's arguments are simply irrelevant to the main 
thrust of my critique, which focused on the categorical quality of ag-
gressive defense. If the defendant is factually guilty and the prospec-
tive punishment is just, why should the potential for state abuse in 
5. Luban, supra note 1, at 1736 (quoting Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: 
Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1199 (1960)). 
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some other situation justify the lawyer in, say, impeaching the truthful 
witness? 
Luban responds that discretionary judgments under contextual 
standards are inappropriate because defenders are overwhelmed and 
underfunded. These facts in themselves, however, are not objections 
to discretionary judgment. On the contrary, if resources are insuffi-
cient to represent adequately all cases, then it is important to focus 
them on the cases where they can do the most good. This type of 
triage decision (to use the term employed in the medical context) is a 
quintessentially discretionary decision, one that necessarily operates 
on presumptions but discards them when unpredictable circumstances 
make it appropriate to do so. 
Luban apparently believes that lawyers will respond to discretion-
ary norms not by reallocating their efforts to cases that they can bene-
fit most, but by using the norms as excuses for an across-the-board 
slackening of effort. I am not sure why he expects this result. Luban's 
own discussion suggests that, even if lawyers abandoned aggressive de-
fense entirely, they would still be unable to perform consistently basic 
tasks that almost anyone would agree should be performed, such as 
counseling the client carefully and interviewing witnesses. Although 
my argument would sometimes give lawyers an excuse for failing to 
engage in aggressive defense, it would leave untouched a panoply of 
defense standards that are, given existing practical constraints, quite 
demanding. My argument might encourage a shift in resources from 
aggressive defense toward these less controversial activities, but that 
strikes me as generally desirable. I do not see how it could encourage 
a general reduction in effort. 
One interpretation of Luban's argument focuses on the effect of the 
ad hoc nullification approach upon defense lawyer morale. He might 
be saying that urging a lawyer to use less than all his technical abilities 
for some clients would subvert professional pride in the same way that 
authorizing a blacksmith to tum out an occasional shoddy horseshoe 
would do so. But this assumes that the lawyer considers her ultimate 
product acquittal, rather than justice. In fact, there is reason to be-
lieve that some defenders are demoralized when they are forced to use 
their advocacy skills in ways that subvert substantively just resolu-
tions. 6 It seems at least as likely that a move to my ad hoc nullifica-
tion approach would improve morale. 
Note also that the function of ethical standards is not simply to 
6. See, e.g., Randy Bellows, Notes of a Public Defender, in THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
LAWYERS 69 (Philip B. Heymann & Lance Liebman eds., 1988). 
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accommodate existing dispositions but to constitute them. Defense 
lawyers' conceptions of what is worthwhile and satisfying about their 
work are shaped by the standards they are taught. Thus, to the extent 
Luban's argument is correct, it is partly self-fulfilling. 
On another interpretation, Luban's claim might be that it is easier 
for supervisors or regulators to review or monitor defense lawyers 
when the standards are categorical than when they are contextual. 
This may be true, but the ease of review is purchased at the cost of 
reduced efficacy in the behavior being reviewed. 7 Whether it is worth 
making this trade-off depends on the quality of judgment of the de-
fense lawyers under review. If they are capable of good contextual 
judgments, then the use of categorical standards that force them to 
take undesirable actions in order to facilitate review is very costly. 
Although we cannot know what the general quality of defense lawyers 
would be under a regime of ad hoc nullification, the use of contextual 
standards of performance is common in professional practice; indeed it 
is often spoken of as the hallmark of professional status. In the con-
text of malpractice and ineffective assistance, standards of professional 
judgment and review are routinely assumed to be contextual. 8 Finally, 
monitoring difficulties do not explain why a blanket requirement of 
aggressive defense should be preferred to a blanket prohibition of it. 
IV. PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE 
Many of the facts Luban cites about the shoddiness of defense 
practice suggest that the issue of aggressive defense is academic, since 
few defense lawyers have the energy, resources, or competence to en-
gage in such tactics even where they believe them warranted. Cer-
tainly these facts support the claim that several defense lawyers have 
made in response to drafts of my article that the real problem is not 
aggressive defense but insufficiently aggressive defense; most defend-
ants do not get even the attention and effort to which they would be 
entitled under far more conservative theories of defense. 
This is an important point. But the importance of the issue of ag-
gressive defense does not depend only on current practices. It is also 
relevant to how we assess the system for the purposes of reform and 
7. See my critique of the use of categorical standards to facilitate monitoring and review in 
the context of welfare administration, William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the 
Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983). 
8. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (refusing to formulate categori-
cal standards to define effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment: "No particu-
lar set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of 
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range oflegitimate decisions regarding how best to 
represent a criminal defendant."). 
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popular legitimation. Whether we can secure agreement and support 
for an increase in defense resources will depend in part on for what 
people think the resources should and would be used. If the extra 
resources fund efforts to substantiate ostensibly good faith factual de-
fenses, many will feel quite differently about them than if they fund 
efforts to uncover evidence to impeach truthful witnesses. If aggres-
sive defense is of trivial practical importance, the arguments for it are 
simply a posture, but that posture has important effects on the popular 
view of the system. Luban expresses amazement that polls show most 
citizens believe to such an implausible extent that guilty defendants 
are going free.9 But that belief strikes me as a perfectly reasonable 
inference from arguments like Luban's that portray aggressive defense 
as a potent bulwark against the rapacious state. 
Another important stake in the argument concerns the moral self-
conception of defense lawyers. The ideology and practice of aggressive 
defense subjects defense lawyers to a kind of moral alienation. It leads 
them to defend their work in terms removed from their deepest moti-
vations and, to the extent they engage in aggressive defense in practice, 
it occasionally requires them to take actions that promote results that 
are inconsistent with their most basic moral commitments. My ap-
proach would lead defense lawyers to express more directly and con-
sistently their deepest motivations and commitments. That ought to 
be counted as an important benefit. 
9. See Luban, supra note 1, at 1742 (noting that "83% of Americans believe that courts do 
not deal harshly enough with criminals, while 79% are more worried that criminals are let off 
too easily than that constitutional rights of some people accused of committing a crime are not 
being upheld"). 
